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ACQUISITION AND PROTECTION OF WATER 
SUPPLIES BY MUNICIPALITIESt 
Wilbert L. Ziegler* 
A MONG the prime functions of a municipal government is the furnishing of a potable supply of water for its in-
habitants. In view of the increasing demand for water and the 
shortage of available supply, a number of problems have been 
or will be encountered by municipalities in fulfilling that func-
tion, apart from the problem of financing. 
Generally speaking two major legal methods have been em-
ployed by municipalities to secure a supply of water for their 
corporate territory, and each method raises peculiar legal prob-
lems. The first method, by far the most popular, is the establish-
ment of a municipal waterworks either within or without the 
corporate limits. In establishing its own facilities the municipal-
ity is confronted with the problem of adequate powers. It must 
have power to overcome limitations imposed by the common 
law and antagonisms presented by the private landowner. Be-
sides power to establish, the municipality needs adequate power 
to protect its water supply against destruction and pollution 
as well as power to protect new sites for future use. When pro-
tection by means of police power regulation is attempted, prob-
lems immediately arise concerning the propriety of individual 
regulations under the state and federal constitutions. These 
problems, although present when the municipality acts within its 
boundaries, always increase when it tries to establish or protect 
its supply outside municipal limits. 
The second major method available to the muncipality for 
securing adequate water supplies is through cooperation with 
others in the formation of a water district. A municipality de-
siring to cooperate in a water district is faced with the problem 
of securing adequate representation both in the formation and 
in the management of the district. This problem, as well as those 
tThis study represents a portion of the project of the Legislative Research Center 
dealing with water law problems. Other studies are published in Water Resources and 
the Law (The University of Michigan Law School) (1958).-Ed. 
•Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, The University of Michigan Law 
School, 1956-1958; Member of the Ohio and Kentucky Bars.-Ed. 
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facing the district, through which the municipality will be operat-
ing, must be considered by a municipal unit before embarking on 
any joint endeavor. 
I. MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS 
Whether a municipality, in the absence of express power from 
the legislature, may provide a water supply for its inhabitants 
is a question for which the courts have not agreed on an answer.1 
Most state legislatures, however, realizing the importance of a 
potable water supply have enacted enabling legislation per-
mitting a municipality to act within its corporate limits to pro-
vide for a supply of water.2 The great number of municipal 
waterworks throughout the country attest to the adequacy of 
these legislative grants of power. 
In many small towns and villages, however, the construction 
or purchase of a waterworks, being a costly endeavor, has been 
unsatisfactory as a method of acquiring a water supply. To solve 
this problem, some jurisdictions have delegated to their munici-
palities power to contract for a water supply.3 This shifts to the 
contracting supplier the burden of providing a source of water, 
establishing and maintaining a waterworks system, and distrib-
uting the water throughout the territory.4 An established sup-
1 61 L.R.A. 33, 34 (1903) sets forth cases which may be cited to support either side 
of the issue. See also 56 AM. JUR., Watenvorks §§24, 54 (1947): City of Gadsden v. 
Mitchell, 145 Ala. 137, 40 S. 557 (1906); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1922). 
2 E.g.: Power to acquire existing waterworks: Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §418; 
Ark. Stat. Ann. (1956 repl.) §§19-2317, 19-4201; Idaho Code Ann. (1957) §50-2815; Power 
to construct waterworks: 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §20(2); Miss. Code 
Ann. (1942) §3374-112; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §38:3; Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §139-
32-1(35); Power of eminent domain to obtain a water supply: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) 
· §§35-401, 35-902; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §418; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §3374-128; 
Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 40, §14; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1949) tit. 32, §639; Ky. Rev. 
Stat. (1956) §94.680. Legislative authority to delegate these powers to the municipality 
"is no longer questioned." East Grand Forks v. Luclc, 97 Minn. 373 at 374, 107 N.W. 393 
(1906); Normal School v. Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, Ill N.E. 573 (1916); Bank of Commerce 
v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927). 
S Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §423; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§96.120 to 96.150; Ark. 
Stat. Ann. (1956 repl.) §19.2319; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §23-36.1; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
(1936) §5.1419. 
4 The court in White v. Meadville, I 77 Pa. 643 at 653, 35 A. 695 (1896), states: "A 
municipality, in its beginnings, is perhaps not financially strong, or its debt may approach 
the constitutional limit so closely that it cannot borrow; nevertheless, the low state of 
its financial condition does not render less urgent the necessity of a water supply; it can 
obtain it in but one way, by contract with those who have the money and are willing to 
invest their private capital in the construction of waterworks. • • ." 
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plier usually can furnish water at a rate cheaper than can the 
municipality which initially has no facilities. In addition to the 
monetary benefits presented, contracting on behalf of its in-
habitants allows the municipality to present a package deal to 
an interested supplier who might be disinterested if required 
to contract individually with each member of the community. 
Legislative enactments empowering a municipality to con-
struct and operate a waterworks or to contract for a water supply 
have existed in most states for many years unchanged and un-
challenged. These powers coupled with the police power of 
the municipality are adequate to enable the municipal unit to 
provide and protect a supply of water within the municipal 
boundaries for itself and its inhabitants.5 The failure of any 
particular jurisdiction to possess legislation granting these pow-
ers to the municipalities is not due to the unwillingness of the 
legislature or to interference by the courts, but rather to the 
absence of need for the legislation and the corresponding lack 
of concern and interest on the part of municipal bodies within 
the state. 
II. MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY OUTSIDE THE CORPORATE LIMITS 
A. General Observations. The universal rule relating to the 
exercise of powers or activities by a municipality outside its 
territorial limits has become firmly entrenched in the common 
law and receives worshipful lip service from all American courts. 
This rule provides that a municipality may not exercise powers 
beyond its territorial limits in the absence of an expressed or 
implied delegation of authority by the state constitution or state 
legislature. 6 Without a constitutional or statutory provision, this 
rule, if applied relentlessly by the courts, would preclude a 
municipality from acquiring extraterritorial land or water rights, 
exercising eminent domain therefor, or exercising extraterritorial 
police power. 
B. Purchase and Holding of Land. A municipality going be-
yond its borders for a source of water must possess and hold 
property outside its boundaries. Only after this power is es-
tablished can the questions concerning extraterritorial eminent 
5 7 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §24.265 (1949). 
6 37 AM. JUR., Mun. Corp. §122 (1941), and cases cited therein. 
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domain or police power arise. Forty states provide municipalities 
with power to purchase and hold property beyond their bound-
aries for the purpose of obtaining potable water.7 No distinction 
is made in the statutes between incorporated or unincorporated 
extraterritorial lands. A majority of the states designate no limi-
tations as to the location of the water facilities, but a few juris-
dictions limit the exercise of the power to an area within a 
specified number of miles from the corporate boundaries.8 These 
distance limitations were added, no doubt, to eliminate con-
flicts between the municip~l units as well as to maintain a certain 
amount of equity in the distribution of the water resources 
among various areas of the state. 
In the absence of an expressed grant of power through the 
constitution, statute, or municipal charter0 to acquire extra-
territorial property, the question of extraterritorial power must 
be resolved by the courts. In spite of the general rule against the 
exercise of extraterritorial powers by a municipality, the majority 
of courts, relying on various modes of legal reasoning,10 have 
7 An extensive note in 1957 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 100 at 101, lists these states as 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 'Wyoming. For spe-
cific statutory language, see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §139-32-1(35); Iowa Code Ann. 
(1946) §397.1; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §96.350; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §3374-112; 20 N.Y. Con-
sol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §20(2). An Indiana act [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 
1950 rep!.; Supp. 1957) §§48-5301 to 48-5374] effectively grants extraterritorial powers by 
permitting the city to organize for itself a waterworks district, the boundaries and powers 
of which extend to a radius of five miles beyond the city limits. 
s Limitations placed on the geographical area in which a municipality may lawfully 
acquire a water supply outside its boundaries vary from two to seventy-five miles from 
the corporate limits. Cf. note, 1957 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 100 at 101. 
9 Typical of charter provisions are those found in Connecticut charters. In that state 
no constitutional or general legislation exists granting to municipalities the power to go 
beyond their borders for a water supply; consequently, issues involving the exercise of 
such powers have arisen in the instance of charter provisions only. The courts have rec-
ognized as valid grants of this power by charter or by special legislation. West Hartford 
v. Board of Water Commissioners, 44 Conn. 360 (1877); Dunham v. New Britain, 55 Conn. 
378, 11 A. 354 (1877). 
10 In some instances, the courts have implied the power from the necessity of the 
occasion. Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474 (1877); Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 
48 N.E. 1092 (1898); Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S.E. 486 (1903). See also Harden 
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. (2d) 630, 284 P. (2d) 9 (1955). In other cases, the courts have 
distinguished between an exercise of governmental authority, which is forbidden beyond 
the corporate bounds, and the mere purchase of land outside the municipality. Becker 
v. La Crosse, 99 Wis. 414, 75 N.W. 84 (1898); Schneider v. Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N.W. 
94 (1903); Smith v. Kuttawa, 222 Ky. 569, 1 S.W. (2d) 979 (1928). 
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allowed the municipalities to acquire lands and property rights 
beyond their boundaries for legitimate municipal purposes.11 
Of the states which possess no express statutory or constitutional 
grant of power to acquire extraterritorial property for a water 
supply,12 Georgia, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have court 
determinations relevant to the discussion. In Georgia, the court, 
in Hall v. Calhoun_, decided that where a city had the power 
to establish and construct a waterworks, without limitation as to 
location, it could go beyond its borders to obtain a supply of 
water.13 The courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, al-
though not faced with a water supply issue, have held that for 
legitimate municipal purposes, a city may acquire land beyond 
its borders.14 There is every reason to believe that a court im-
pressed with the realization that "a city is not a self-sufficing 
unit"15 will permit the municipality to acquire and hold property 
beyond its corporate limits for municipal purposes, including 
property for a water supply, even though the municipality has no 
constitutional or statutory grant of power.16 
C. Extraterritorial Condemnation. Although a municipality 
may be permitted by the courts or empowered by the legislature 
to purchase and hold extraterritorial lands for a water supply, it 
may lack the power of extraterritorial eminent domain. The 
power of eminent domain is not included necessarily in the power 
11 " ••• [I]t is believed that the rule, supported by the weight of authority as well as 
by the better reasoning, is that a municipal corporation, where not expressly prohibited, 
may purchase real estate outside of its corporate limits, for legitimate municipal pur-
poses .•.. " JO McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §28.05 (1950); Smith v. 
Kuttawa, 222 Ky. 569, 1 S.W. (2d) 979 (1928); Fournier v. Berlin, 92 N.H. 142, 26 A. (2d) 
366 (1942); Lester v. Jackson, 69 Miss. 887, 11 S. 114 (1892); Mathers v. Moss, 202 Ark. 
554, 151 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941); Ft. Payne Co. v. Ft. Payne, 216 Ala. 679, 114 S. 63 (1927), 
but cf. Donable's Admr. v. Harrisburg, 104 Va. 533, 52 S.E. 174 (1905). 
12 The states which possess no express statutory or constitutional grant of power 
to acquire extraterritorial property for a water supply include Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. 
13 140 Ga. 611, 79 S.E. 533 (1913). The court refused to follow an earlier decision, 
Loyd v. Columbus, 90 Ga. 20, 15 S.E. 818 (1892), which prohibited a municipality from 
providing for extraterritorial disposition of its sewage. 
14 Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 48 N.E. 1092 (1898); Fournier v. Berlin, 
92 N.H. 142, 26 A. (2d) 366 (1942). Both cases determined that a municipality could 
acquire a gravel pit located outside its territorial limits. The pit involved in the Massa-
chusetts case was situated in another municipality. 
15 Anderson, "The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities," 10 MINN. L. REV. 475 (1926). 
16 Wehrle v. Board of Water & Power Commissioners of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 70, 
293 P. 67 (1930); E. Hartford Fire Dist. v. Glastonbury Power Co., 92 Conn. 217, 102 A. 
592 (1917); Natcher v. Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W. (2d) 255 (1936). 
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to purchase and hold land. It is distinct and must be expressly 
or impliedly delegated to the municipality.17 Many states have 
provided expressly that a municipality may exercise eminent 
domain beyond its corporate limits in order to acquire a water 
supply or the facilities therefor.18 Like the power to purchase 
lands, the power of extraterritorial condemnation is not limited 
to incorporated or unincorporated lands, but is restricted by 
some states to a designated geographical area immediately outside 
the corporate limits.19 
In a jurisdiction which has no provision granting to the 
municipality power to condemn outside lands for a water supply, 
the courts must decide the question of whether, in a particular 
instance, a municipality may exercise this power. This question 
has been presented to the courts in two factual settings. The 
first involves a municipality which has express power to hold 
property beyond its limits but no express power to condemn 
therefor; the second arises when express power to hold and con-
demn land within the city limits for a water supply is granted 
but there is no express power to condemn beyond the corporate 
boundaries.20 In the first situation, the Michigan Supreme Court 
in the case of Allegan v. Iosco Land Co.21 held that a constitu-
tional provision permitting any city or village to "acquire, ovm 
17 I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §3.221(3) (1950), citing the federal and thirty-one 
state jurisdictions, states: "The establishment of a municipal corporation by the legisla-
ture, and the grant of a charter to the corporation so established containing provisions 
for the exercise of the usual governmental powers by such a body within its territorial 
limits, does not in itself convey the power to take land by eminent domain in order to 
carry such powers into effect, and in the absence of express or necessarily implied authority 
from the legislature neither a municipal corporation nor its officers and boards can ex-
ercise the power of eminent domain." 
18 ·E.g., Idaho Code Ann. (1957) §50-2815; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §74-2; Iowa 
Code Ann. (1946) §397.8(1); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §457.02; 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKin-
ney, Supp. 1958) §20(2). 
19 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §94.680, which limits condemnation power to territory 
within the county where the city is located. The legislature may lawfully delegate ex-
traterritorial eminent domain power to municipalities. Allegan v. Iosco Land Co., 254 
Mich. 560, 236 N.W. 863 (1931); I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §3.221(3) (1950), and cases 
cited therein; 18 AM. JUR., Eminent Domain §26 (1938). 
20 Where a municipality is not permitted to own or operate a city water supply even 
within its limits, the question of eminent domain is moot. 
21254 Mich. 560, 236 N.W. 863 (1931). The court, however, permitted the city to 
condemn beyond its boundaries for a water supply under its home rule charter which 
authorized extraterritorial acquisition of a public utility by condemnation. For statutes 
expressly delegating to Michigan municipalities the power of eminent domain to be ex-
ercised for a water supply beyond their corporate limits, see .Mich. Stat. Ann (1936) §8.71, 
(1949) §5.1893, (Supp. 1957) §5.2079(3). 
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and operate, either within or without its corporate limits, public 
utilities for supplying water ... "22 did not confer power to 
condemn public utilities.23 On the other hand, in the case of 
Helm v. Grayville,24 the Illinois Supreme Court held that where 
a city by statute had the power to purchase, lease, or acquire by 
gift land for a ferry outside its corporate limits, the city likewise 
could exercise the power of eminent domain for this purpose. 
Although this case did not involve the acquisition of a water 
supply, it manifests a judicial attitude, which, in opposition 
to the Michigan court, 25 would permit a city having the power 
to purchase land for a public water utility also to exercise eminent 
domain. The principle of the Illinois decision appears, by weight 
of numbers, to be the majority rule;26 however, in view of the 
scarcity of judicial opinions on the issue, it cannot be alleged 
with certainty that if a city is granted power to purchase land 
beyond its limits for a water supply, it will be permitted by the 
courts to exercise eminent domain for this purpose. 
Several cases have treated the issue of whether power of 
extraterritorial condemnation by a city can be implied from an 
express grant of this power within the city. Once again the 
Michigan Supreme Court has given a strict interpretation to a 
provision granting power to villages. The Michigan court held 
that where a village had condemnation power within its limits 
to obtain a water supply, but no power expressly granted to 
acquire water outside the village, the village could not condemn 
land without its boundaries for this purpose.27 This rule, how-
ever, has not received approval in other jurisdictions. Decisions 
22 MICH. CoNsr., Art. VIII, §23. 
23 Cf. Detroit v. Circuit Judge, 237 Mich. 446, 212 N.W. 207 (1927), relating to acquisi-
tion of a park beyond the corporate limits of the city of Detroit by means of condemnation. 
24 224 Ill. 274, 79 N.E. 689 (1906). 
25 In the area of municipal powers the Michigan Supreme Court has been most con-
servative. See Houghton v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N.W. 820 (1885); 
People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 2ll (1902). 
26 Warner v. Gunnison, 2 Colo. App. 430 (1892); Colorado Springs v. Public Utilities 
Comm., 126 Colo. 265, 248 P. (2d) 3ll (1952); Sewer Improvement Dist. #l of Sheridan 
v. Jones, Admx., 199 Ark. 534, 134 S.W. (2d) 551 (1939); Central Power Co. v. Nebraska 
City, (8th Cir. 1940) ll2 F. (2d) 471. Cf. Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 120, 288 P. 258 
(1930). 
27 Houghton v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N.W. 820 (1885). The 
rule has been formulated thus: "When the power to exercise eminent domain for certain 
purposes is expressly granted to a municipal corporation, land outside its territorial 
limits cannot be condemned without special authority .•.. " l NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 
§3.221(3) (1950). Cf. 18 A11r. JUR., Eminent Domain §27 (1938). 
356 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
in Colorado,28 Illinois,29 and Washington,30 although not involv-
ing water supplies, clearly indicate that the Michigan rule of 
strict interpretation is in the minority. In West Virginia31 and 
Wyoming,32 the courts have held that where a city has condem-
nation power to obtain a water supply, and there are no express 
limitations on the territory in which the water may be obtained, 
the city may condemn land beyond its corporate limits. 
Without the power of eminent domain, a municipality, be-
cause of local animosity or inability to reach a monetary agree-
ment, may effectively be deprived of a water supply outside 
its jurisdiction even though it has the power to purchase and hold 
outside property. A court determination denying the munici-
pality extraterritorial eminent domain power can be avoided by a 
legislative enactment granting to municipal units the power of 
condemnation for a water supply beyond their boundaries. 
D. Water Rights Without Condemnation. The power to 
acquire property is essential for the municipality going beyond 
its limits for a supply of water, but acquisition by purchase or 
condemnation is expensive. A municipality must look not only to 
its power to acquire property but also to the cost of the develop-
ment. In this regard, it is necessary to examine what water rights 
beyond its boundaries a municipality may acquire without cost 
as incident to its acquisition of outside lands.33 When a munici-
pality ventures beyond its limits to establish a reservoir to capture 
diffused surface waters, or to dam a stream or lake causing 
inundation of lands, the municipality will be forced to acquire, 
by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, the lands which are 
to be covered by water. However, the problem remains whether 
the municipality must compensate anyone for the water it takes 
from beyond its corporate limits. 
The two legal doctrines which have prevailed in the field of 
28 Colorado Central Power Co. v. Englewood, (10th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 233; Public 
Serv. Co. v. Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493 (1926), concerning the taking of a power 
plant. 
29 Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 140 III. 216, 29 N.E. 704 (1892), concerning extrater• 
ritorial sewage disposal. 
30 Puyallup v. Lacey, 43 Wash. 110, 86 P. 215 (1906), concerning the straightening of 
a stream, one bank of which was beyond the corporate limits. 
31 White v. Romney, 69 W. Va. 606, 73 S.E. 323 (1911). 
32 Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677 (1911). 
33 For a detailed presentation of the common law doctrines of water use law, includ-
ing a consideration of the water rights of municipalities, see Ziegler, "Water Use Under 
Common Law Doctrine," WATER REsOURCES AND THE I.Aw (1958). 
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water use are the doctrines of absolute use and reasonable use. By 
the theory of absolute use, a landowner is entitled to possession 
and complete control of all waters coming to his land. Under 
the reasonable use concept, a landowner is permitted to make 
a use of the waters to which he has access which is reasonable in 
relation to other uses being made of the same supply of water. 
The doctrine of absolute use would assure to the municipality 
control of a water supply by mere ownership of land; the doctrine 
of reasonable use may render the same. assurance in application, 
or it may not, depending upon whether the use by the munici-
pality is considered reasonable. 
The doctrine of reasonableness has always been applied to 
the use of water from natural streams or lakes on which more 
than one person's land abuts, although the courts have desig-
nated certain uses as unreasonable per se.34 Under the reasonable 
use concept, the courts have not been sympathetic to the needs 
of the municipalities which have come beyond their bounds 
to tap a natural stream or lake for water. When a municipality's 
activity results in in jury to a lawful use made by another 
riparian landowner, a city will be prohibited from continuing 
its use unless it condemns the water right of the complainant. 
Or the city may be ordered by the court to pay damages for the 
injury caused.35 This method employed by the courts eliminates 
a condemnation action by the municipality, yet accomplishes the 
same end. Basically, there are two principles of water use law 
underlying the courts' decisions against the municipalities. First, 
use of water from a natural stream or lake on land not abutting 
the waters is an unlawful use;36 secondly, a city with its many 
inhabitants was never contemplated at common law to be a "ri-
parian landowner" entitled to make a reasonable use of water 
flowing by his land. 37 
In determining the relative rights of landowners to make use 
of the ground waters flowing beneath their land, the courts tradi-
tionally have applied the doctrine of absolute use.88 This theory, 
84 E.g., Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130 (1854). 
35 Ibid.; Elkhart v. Christiana Hydraulics, 223 Ind. 242, 59 N.E. (2d) 353 (1945); 
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903). 
so Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913). 
37 Pernell v. Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E. (2d) 449 (1941). 
38 New River Co. v. Johnson, 2 El. &: EI. 435, 121 Eng. Rep. 164 (1860); Houston &: 
T.C.R. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904); Fire District v. Graniteville Spring 
Water Co., 103 Vt. 89, 152 A. 42 (1930). 
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if extended to a municipality pumping water from its extraterri-
torial land, would allow the municipal unit to use all the ground 
water it required regardless of any resultant injury to other users. 
However, as the practice of diverting waters from one ground wa-
ter basin to another increased, the courts refused to follow an ab-
solute use principle and applied the doctrine of reasonable use.39 
An application of this doctrine generally will result in a munici-
pal corporation being denied the right to divert ground waters 
for use in the municipality some distance away, if injury to other 
lawful ground water users results.40 
There is little or no indication of what result will be reached 
by the courts if a municipality, in constructing a reservoir to 
collect diffused surface waters flowing over its lands, interferes 
with another landowner's use of these waters. The owner of land 
is considered to have absolute control over the diffused waters on 
his land;41 however, it is likely that, as in the case of ground water, 
the courts will apply some form of reasonable use doctrine when a 
municipality's diverting of diffused water away from the area of 
its source results in injury to another user. 
In any instance of a municipal corporation diverting water 
from outside its limits into the city for use by its inhabitants, 
where no injury results to another user, it is highly probable that, 
in most states, the courts will not interfere with the city's divert-
ing.42 Where, at the suit of any particular complainant, a muni-
cipal unit is held not to be entitled to divert water for a water sup-
ply, the municipality is not deprived thereby of its water source. 
The decision of the court against the municipality merely re-
quires purchase or condemnation of the water rights of the com-
plainant which the court held were violated by the actions of the 
municipality. 
39 Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 (1902): Forbell v. City of New York, 
164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909); 
K.och v. Wick, (Fla. 1956) 87 S. (2d) 47. 
· 40 Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Canada v. Shawnee, 
179 Okla. 53, 64 P. (2d) 694 (1937). 
41 Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa 160 (1866); Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kan. 149 (1881); 
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W. (2d) 221 (1936); Messinger v. Wood-
cock, 159 Ore. 435, 80 P. (2d) 895 (1938). Contra: Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 
569 (1862); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870). The New Hampshire cases apply the rule 
of reasonable use. 
42 Crawford v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); Stratton v. Mt. Hermon 
Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913): McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 
38 N.D. 465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917); Harris v. Norfolk &: Western Ry. Co., 153 N.C. 542, 69 
S.E. 623 (1910). 
1959] MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLIES 359 
In western prior appropriation states,43 a municipality, like 
any individual, is entitled to appropriate, in accordance with the 
statutory procedure, available water and to acquire thereby a 
right to take a determined quantity.44 This right is subject only 
to the rights of users prior in time. No distinction is made as to 
the location of the municipal unit in relation to the water source 
or as to the quantity of water appropriated. If there is no water 
available because of prior appropriations, the municipality must 
rely on its power to purchase or condemn the prior rights. 
E. Extraterritorial Police Power. As previously discussed,45 
the municipal corporation in acquiring an extraterritorial water 
supply may be required to purchase or condemn water rights in 
addition to lands if the diverting interferes with other persons' 
uses of the water. There are, however, other rights belonging to 
landowners adjacent to a natural supply of water which, when ex-
ercised, probably will not be bothered by the municipality, but 
will interfere with the municipal use by damaging the purity of 
the water. These uses include swimming, boating, bathing, and 
fishing in natural streams and lakes as well as reasonable use of 
the land located about the waters.46 If a municipality has no ex-
traterritorial police power, it is unable to prevent acts which may 
tend to pollute the waters unless it condemns the landowner's 
rights to the use. Although a municipality may possess police 
power within its boundaries sufficient to protect its water, the 
necessity for preserving the purity of a potable water supply 
does not terminate at the municipal limits. 
There are traditional legal methods available to the city to 
protect its outside water supply. The city -may exclude persons 
from its reservoir47 or sue to enjoin trespass thereon. But, as a 
43 Seventeen western states have by constitutional provision or statutory enactment 
adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation for their surface streams and lakes. Many 
of these states likewise apply this doctrine to their ground water supplies. Diffused surface 
water uses are still regulated by the common law in these states insofar as the common 
law is applicable to local conditions. 
44 For examples of prior appropriation statutes, see Cal. Water Code (Deering, 1954) 
§1200 et seq. 
45 Part 11-D supra. 
46 These rights are incident to the ownership of land located along the banks of 
a stream or lake. 
47 E.g., Phillips v. City of Golden, 91 Colo. 331, 14 P. (2d) 1013 (1932). In this case 
the court, in denying petitioner's claim for damages from the city growing out of injury 
to his cattle when driven from city property, affirmed the proposition that the city has 
a right to drive the cattle from its watershed. 
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practical matter, these remedies against individual trespassers are 
ineffectual since it is most difficult for the municipality to show 
actual damages, and the sanctions imposed for trespass in the ab-
sence of provable damages are de minimis. As a riparian owner, 
the city has the right to enjoy the water passing by its land in an 
undefiled state;48 however, other landowners similarly situated 
have a right to use the water and their land adjacent in a reason-
able manner.49 Boating, swimming, bathing, and fishing are rea-
sonable uses of the water;50 cattle raising, plowing, and fertilizing 
appear to be reasonable uses of the adjacent land.51 Since these 
are reasonable uses, the municipality is in a difficult position try-
ing to prevent them through court in junction. Only by a valid 
exercise of the police power can these rights to the use of water 
and the land adjacent be regulated or curtailed without an exer-
cise of eminent domain. 
The courts have agreed, with only a few exceptions, that a 
municipality may not exercise police power beyond its jurisdic-
tional limits unless this power has been delegated specifically by 
the legislature or by the state constitution.52 In certain cases, the 
courts have permitted a municipality, without express delegated 
power, to regulate enterprises located outside the municipality 
as a condition to permitting that enterprise to do business within 
the corporate limits.53 However, a municipal ordinance designed 
to prohibit or limit certain activities beyond the municipal 
boundaries to safeguard the purity of a municipal water supply 
is a mandatory, unconditional _prohibition and cannot be justified 
48 See 56 AM. JUR., Waters §405 (1947), and cases from thirty jurisdictions cited in 
support thereof. 
49 Id., §406. 
50 Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930); Butler v. Atty. Gen., 195 Mass. 
79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907); State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 189 (1911); 56 AM. JUR., Waters 
§275 (1947). But see Harvey Realty Co. v. Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930), 
where bathing and swimming by a great number of people is not considered as being 
within the riparian right. See dictum in People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 
(1902); Battle Creek v. Resort Assn., 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914). 
51 See George v. Village of Chester, 111 N.Y.S. 722 (1908). 
52 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §24.57 (1949). 
53 In re Blois, 179 Cal. 291, 176 P. 449 (1918); State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W. 
1066 (1896); Hall Bros. v. Cleveland, (Ohio App. 1953) 115 N.E. (2d) 697; Sterett &: Oberle 
Packing Co. v. Portland, 79 Ore. 260, 154 P. 410 (1916); Korth v. Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 
261 P. 895 (1927); Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473 (1903). Contra: Oakland v. Brock, 8 Cal. 
(2d) 639, 67 P. (2d) 344 (1937); Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E. (2d) 317 (1937); 
Higgins v. Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E. (2d) 520 (1948); Dean Milk Co. v. Aurora, 404 
Ill. 331, 88 N.E. (2d) 827 (1949). 
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under those cases dealing with licensing or inspection of outside 
milk plants or slaughterhouses.54 
There are only two cases in which the courts have indicated 
that a municipality may exercise unconditional extraterritorial 
police power without an express grant of power from the legisla-
ture. In Lexington v. ]ones,55 it appeared that the city of 
Lexington provided for the fining of anyone who tapped into 
the city sewer line located outside the city without paying the 
sewerage fee. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld this prac-
tice stating that it constituted a valid exercise of the police power 
of the city.56 In Missouri, the high court, in the case of Chambers 
v. St. Louis,51 decided that the city of St. Louis may hold land out-
side its corporate limits without special legislative sanction. By 
way of dictum, the court, referring to the lands stated that the 
city may exercise "such police powers as would be required in 
order to make them answer the purposes for which they were de-
signed."58 These two cases, when compared to the great number 
of cases to the contrary, are insignificant, and as precedent can-
not justify a municipality's exercise of extraterritorial police 
power to preserve its water supply in the absence of a delegation 
of power by the legislature or the constitution. 
Many legislatures have been aware of the problem of munici-
palities having a supply of water beyond their territorial limits 
54 In Sterett & Oberle Packing Co. v. Portland, 79 Ore. 260, 154 P. 410 (1916), the 
court pointed out that an ordinance providing for the maintenance of certain health 
standards for outside slaughterhouses was valid only as it prohibited the sale of meats 
within the city and not as it attempted to enforce regulation of production outside the 
city limits. This same distinction is made by the court in State v. Davis, 1 Tenn. C.C.A. 
550 (19ll). 
55 289 Ky. 719, 160 S.W. (2d) 19 (1942). 
56 In a concluding paragraph of the case, the court points out Ky. Rev. Stat. §§3058-5, 
3058-23 [now Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§84.170, 84.010]. The first of these sections gives cities 
power to regulate by ordinance the use of culverts and sewers; the second allows a city 
to impose fines for violations of any city ordinance. Neither section refers expressly to 
actions beyond the city limits. It is not apparent from a reading of the decision what 
importance the court placed on these two sections as constituting a legislative grant of 
power to the city to regulate by its police power the connections with its sewer lines 
located beyond its corporate limits. 
57 29 Mo. 543 (1860). 
58 Id. at 575. In Pueblo v. Flanders, 122 Colo. 571, 225 P. (2d) 832 (1950), a taxpayer 
attempted to enjoin the city of Pueblo from furnishing gratuitously fire service to in-
habitants outside the city. The court in denying the injunction distinguished between an 
exercise of governmental power to regulate persons beyond the limits of the city and 
an exercise of the power to assist persons beyond the boundaries of the city. The court 
held that the latter was not within the rule prohibiting a city from exercising its govern-
mental powers beyond the corporate limits. 
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which must be protected, and in more than one half of the 
states the legislatures have granted municipalities sufficient police 
power to safeguard the purity of these waters.59 With the ex-
ception of the Washington Supreme Court,60 courts deciding the 
issue have sustained legislative delegations of extraterritorial 
police power to municipalities.61 
III. VALIDITY oF REGULATIONS DESIGNED To PROTECT 
MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY 
The foregoing discussion indicates that, except in Washing-
ton,62 a grant of police power to a municipality by the legislature 
to protect the municipality's water supply will be upheld as to 
waters located within or without the corporate limits. A more 
controversial attitude surrounds the issue of the validity of 
particular ordinances passed pursuant to a legislative grant of 
authority, and it is to a consideration of these ordinances that 
the discussion now turns. 
The legal challenge to the validity of an exercise of the 
police power to preserve the purity of a water supply and the 
legal principles utilized in a solution of the problem will be 
the same whether the power is exercised within or without the 
municipality, or whether a municipal ordinance, state law, county 
regulation, or district ordinance is involved. In view of this 
fact, it seems proper to consider without distinction all decisions 
in which the validity of a water purity statute or ordinance has 
59 Note, 1957 UNIV. ILL. L. FotmM 99 at 101, lists these states as Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Kentucky recently 
enacted a similar provision, Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §96.355. 
60 Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 P. 112 (1927). WASH. CONST., Art. 
XI, §11, reads: "Any county, city, town or township, may make and enforce within its 
limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with 
general laws." This provision is viewed as a delegation of plenary power to local divisions 
of government but limited to the objects designated. Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 293, 
48 P. (2d) 238 (1935). Ohio has a constitutional provision, Omo CoNST., Art. XVIII, §3, 
nearly identical in language to the Washington section; however, the Ohio statute [Ohio 
Rev. Code (Page, 1953) §743.25] granting police power to the municipalities in Ohio to 
preserve their outside water supplies has never been questioned as being unconstitutional. 
61 E.g., Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361 (1881); Treadgill v. State, (Tex. Crim. App. 
1954) 275 S.W. (2d) 658. 
62 Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 P. 112 (1927). 
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been questioned. This broad view will facilitate an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of a city's police power over its source of 
potable water. 
State statutes prohibiting the discharge of polluting matter 
into any body of water from ,vhich a public drinking supply is 
taken uniformly have been declared valid exercises of the police 
power, 63 even though there was no showing that the particular 
discharge of polluting matter adversely affected the quality of 
the water at the intake for the public supply.64 Because of the 
great difficulty of showing that any particular dumping of pollut-
ing materials into the water affected the quality at the city's 
source of supply, it is of notable importance that the courts 
have held the statutes valid without proof of actual damage to 
the waters. Logically, there appears no reason why a municipal 
ordinance prohibiting the discharge of polluting matter into 
the municipality's water supply should not be upheld as a 
valid exercise of the police power in the same manner as state 
statutes prohibiting similar actions have been sustained. 
Differing only in degree from those statutes and ordinances 
which prohibit the depositing of contaminating matters into 
potable water sources are the enactments forbidding activities 
in or on waters used for a water supply. These activities include, 
among others, swimming, bathing, boating and fishing. Regu-
lations of the activities of the general public in or on a water 
supply, as a rule, have been upheld by the courts.65 Where 
regulations have interfered with private riparian rights to swim, 
bathe, boat, or fish, however, there is a clear split of authority 
as to the validity of the regulations. Some courts have upheld 
restrictions on private water rights for the purpose of maintain-
63 State v. Wheeler, 44 N.J.L. 88 (1882); State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 39 A. 260 (1896). 
Cf. State v. Chemical Co. of America, 90 N.J. Eq. 425, 107 A. 164 (1919); City of Lawrence 
v. Commissioners of Public Works, 318 Mass. 520, 62 N.E. (2d) 850 (1945); Sprague v. 
Door, 185 -Mass. 10, 69 N.E. 344 (1904); Miles City v. State Board of Health, 39 Mont. 
405, 102 P. 696 (1909); Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906); Topeka 
Water Supply Co. v. Potwin Place, 43 Kan. 404, 23 P. 578 (1890). But see People v. Elk 
River M. & L. Co., 107 Cal. 221, 40 P. 531 (1895), in which the court expresses sympathy 
with the riparian loggers as opposed to the needs of the municipality for a pure supply 
of water. 
64 Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906); State v. Wheeler, 44 
N.J.L. 88 (1882); Miles City v. State Board of Health, 39 Mont. 405, 102 P. 696 (1909). 
65 Birmingham v. Lake, 243 Ala. 367, 10 S. (2d) 24 (1942); Shreveport v. Conrad, 212 
La. 738, 33 S. (2d) 503 (1947); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 230 Mass. 6, 118 N.E. 643 (1918). 
364 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
ing the purity of the water for public use.66 On the other hand, 
courts in Michigan, 67 Wisconsin, 68 and Florida69 have held in-
valid ordinances interfering with private rights to swim, bathe, 
or boat in waters used for a public supply.70 The conflict of 
cases is clear. A court faced for the first time with the issue 
of whether regulation of private rights to protect a p.ublic water 
supply is constitutional can find case authority to support either 
an affirmative or a negative determination. 
Besides control of pollution discharge or boating and swim-
ming, it is often necessary, in order to assure pure water, to 
regulate the ways in which lands located within the watershed 
of a stream or lake may be used. The purity of a body of water 
is not determined solely by what may be thrmvn into it by 
persons along the shore or diffused into it by swimmers or 
bathers. Streams and lakes are fed by their respective watersheds 
with runoff and seepage water. This water will vary in degree 
of purity depending upon what materials may be present on or 
within the soil of the watershed. 
Generally, regulations aimed at eliminating pollution caused 
by activities on the lands surrounding the water source, if rea-
son~bly calculated to effectuate the purpose of preserving water 
purity, will be upheld by the courts.71 A minority view was 
voiced in the case of George v. Village of Chester.72 In that case 
the court held that a village, after condemning a part of a lake for 
a water supply, could not enforce a state public health ordinance 
against the defendant so as to prohibit him from farming his 
land located along the lake. This regulation, in the mind of the 
court, would constitute the taking of private property without 
66 State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 189 (1911); State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 A. 
337 (1937); State v. Finney, 65 Idaho 630, 150 P. (2d) 130 (1944). 
67 People .v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902). But cf. Battle Creek v. 
Resort Assn., 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914). 
68 Bino v. Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W. (2d) 571 (1956). 
69 Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125, 77 S. 666 (1918). 
70 Cf. In re Clinton Water District, 36 Wash. (2d) 282, 218 P. (2d) 309 (1950), where 
the court required the city in a condemnation suit to compensate the landowners for 
the value of their riparian rights which would be taken away by the operation of a public 
health statute applicable when the city used the waters for a public supply. 
71 Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 145 P. 1047 (1915); Ophir v. Ault, 67 Utah 
214,247 P. 290 (1926); New York v. Kelsey, 143 N.Y.S. 41 (1913); West Frankfort v. Fullop, 
6 Ill. (2d) 609, 129 N.E. (2d) 682 (1955); Durango v. Chapman, 27 Colo. 169, 60 P. 635 
(1900); State v. Perley, 249 U.S. 510 (1919), affg. 173 N.C. 783, 92 S.E. 504 (1917). 
72111 N.Y.S. 722 (1908). 
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compensation.73 In Bountiful City v. De Luca74 the Utah Su-
preme Court refused to enforce a city ordinance so as to exclude 
a sheep herder from pasturing his flock along the city's water 
source. The court limited the ordinance to apply only if the 
defendant did not use reasonable care to prevent pollution from 
the grazing of his sheep. In the Washington decision of In re 
Clinton Water District,15 the court required the city to com-
pensate riparians for the decrease in the value of their lands 
which would result from the application of state public health 
laws when the city began using the water for its municipal 
supply. 
In both the George and the Bountiful City cases, the court 
appears to be bothered by the fact that if the ordinances in 
question were upheld or strictly applied, the defendants would 
be deprived of the only feasible use of their particular pieces of 
land. In effect, the ordinances would do more than regulate 
the use of land; they would deprive the owner of his land by 
depriving him of the only practical use of it under the circum-
stances. There is little doubt that the courts deciding the George 
and Bountiful City cases would lend a more friendly ear to 
regulation which excluded one type of use, but, as a practical 
matter, permitted any of several other types of uses to be made of 
the property. The Clinton Water District decision may be dis-
tinguished on its facts as being an action of condemnation and not 
a determination involving the validity of a state or municipal 
regulation against pollution of a public water supply; however, 
in principle the case denies to the city power to prohibit pollution · 
of its public water supply through use of the state police power. 
A city contemplating condemnation for a water supply would 
do well to give close consideration to the case and to the possibil-
ity that, in an eminent domain proceeding, it will be forced 
73 In the George decision, the public health regulation which the village tried to 
enforce again5t the defendant provided that the municipal corporation in whose favor 
the regulation was invoked was required to pay for any damages resulting from its en-
forcement. Although the court seemed to hold that the regulation without compensation 
would be invalid, it might be argued that the court was influenced by the terms of the 
regulation and therefore required the village to compensate the defendant if it intended 
to maintain the land use restrictions. See Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183, 29 N.E. 664 
(1885); Rockville Water & Aqueduct Co. v. Koelsch, 90 Conn. 171, 96 A. 947 (1916). Both 
cases involved statutes which provided for an award of damages to the defendant where 
his activity was prevented because it caused damage to the public water supply. 
74 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 194 (1930). 
75 36 Wash. (2d) 282, 218 P. (2d) 309 (1950). 
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to compensate private individuals located on the watershed for 
any depreciation in value of their lands due to the prospective 
enforcement of existing ordinances or statutes against contamin-
ation of public water supplies.76 
In summarizing the state of the law relative to the exercise 
of police power to protect a city's water supply, the distinction 
between a regulation of the general rights of the public and a 
regulation of individual property rights must be drawn. Gen-
erally, a regulation of the public's rights will be maintained, if 
at all reasonable, since no private property is being appropriated. 
With reference to legislation which interferes with or eliminates 
private rights, in view of the clear-cut division of authority, it 
seems fair to conclude that the decision of the court will depend, 
not upon abstract principles of law or precedent, but upon the 
feelings and beliefs of the individual members of the court. In 
jurisdictions where private rights to the use of water have been 
firmly entrenched and dutifully respected, it will not be at all 
surprising if the courts require a municipality to make use of its 
power of eminent domain rather than its police power to safe-
guard the purity of its water supply. 
IV. WATER DISTRICTS AND MUNICIPAL PARTICIPATION 
A. General Observations. The foregoing parts of this paper 
have concerned the legal questions encountered by a municipality 
attempting on its own to obtain for itself and its inhabitants a 
supply of water either within or without its corporate limits. 
· There is, however, a definite trend, as evidenced by state legis-
lative activity, toward cooperation by municipalities as a unit 
with other persons or other governmental units in obtaining 
a joint supply of water. This may be agreement between munici-
palities to secure a joint source of supply, or an organized water 
district in which the municipality participates as a member. 
There are several features of a joint endeavor to obtain a 
water supply which make it attractive to a municipality. First, 
since the monetary investment necessary to establish an operating 
water system is great, particularly where water is difficult to. 
acquire, it is often advantageous to pool financial resources, 
76 The regulations of land use for the purpose of protecting the purity of water 
supplies are very similar to zoning regulations. It is notable that the courts have drawn 
no distinction between existing non-conforming uses and future uses as has been done 
in the instance of zoning. 
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thereby cutting the cost to the individual municipal corpora-
tion.77 In this connection, if a municipality acts alone in es-
tablishing a reservoir, or other water facility, it will receive no 
compensation for any indirect benefits, such as stream flow 
regulation, afforded to other governmental units or private in-
dividuals. Cooperative endeavors provide for a share of the 
cost as well as of the benefit to be apportioned among the par-
ticipating members. Secondly, a cooperative endeavor engenders 
a cooperative spirit between the municipality and its neighbors. 
This spirit is most beneficial to a city, town, or village looking 
beyond its corporate boundaries for a water supply or water 
transportation facilities. Thirdly, a joint venture, particularly 
a water district, may permit the exercise of greater powers to 
acquire water than usually are possessed by a single municipality. 
Fourthly, a joint endeavor often will allow the use of revenue 
raising measures separate from the revenue means available to 
individual municipalities, thereby providing a method to avoid 
the debt or tax limitations imposed on the individual 
municipality.78 
Legislative enactments providing for the formation of water 
supply districts are numerous. For the purposes of this paper, 
it is necessary to mention only certain kinds of water districts. 
Districts which are formed and operated independently of any 
participation by the city, town, or village governing body do 
not warrant special consideration, although the area within a 
municipality sometimes may be included in the district.79 Even 
though not participating in an official manner the municipality 
may encourage action by its citizenry through these districts as 
a means of bringing water into the area. Nevertheless, from the 
viewpoint of a municipal government seeking a water supply 
for its inhabitants, a district act which completely ignores the 
municipal unit is of little value. 
Another type of water supply district is that in which the 
77 The condemnation of conflicting water rights, the housing of waterworks facilities, 
and the excavation for pipelines are but a few of the instances in which the cost for 
jointly operating municipalities will be only slightly more than that for a municipality 
acting alone. 
78 See 38 AM. JUR., Mun. Corp. §435 (1941); 94 A.L.R. 818 (1935). 
79 For examples of water district acts in which the municipal governments are denied 
any participation, see Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 82, §§701 to 764; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) 
§§75-18-1 to 75-18-39; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955; Supp. 1958) §§6-2601 to 6-2627; Idaho 
Code Ann. (1947; Supp. 1957) §§42-3201 to 42-3227; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1949) §§247.230 
to 247.670. 
368 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
municipality plays a part in the formation and/or operation of 
the district. In these districts the municipality, through its gov-
erning body, works along with other municipalities and individ-
ual citizens in bringing potable water into the district area. 
A final category of districts includes those which are organized 
and managed solely by joint cooperation of two or more munici-
palities through the governing bodies of the municipal units. 
Enactments of the legislatures enabling the formation of water 
supply districts which allow or require action by municipal 
governments are the ones which will assist the municipality to 
answer the growing demand for water by its inhabitants. This 
is the type of water district act which deserves careful con-
sideration in a study of the methods available to the municipal 
unit to secure a water supply. 
B. Districts Allowing Partial Participation by Municipal 
Governments. There are two methods commonly employed in 
water district acts for permitting a degree of participation in 
district affairs to the municipal governments encompassed with-
in the area of the district. Participation may be provided, first, in 
the procedure for forming the district or, second, in the provi-
sions for management of the operations of the district. The first 
is characterized by a procedural provision permitting the munici-
pality on behalf of its inhabitants to sign the petition,80 initiate 
the proceeding,81 or appear at the hearing82 for the formation 
of the district. Although district acts vary considerably in their 
procedure for establishment, there are several which allow only 
this form of participation by the municipal officials and fail to 
give further recognition in any other provision to the repre-
sentatives of the interests of the municipal unit. A municipa_lity 
which is seeking active management in the affairs of its water 
district needs greater recognition than is afforded by a district 
act allowing municipal participation only at the formation level. 
When compared with district acts giving no consideration to 
the municipal government, an act allowing the municipality to 
sign a petition, initiate a proceeding, or appear at the hearing 
for or against the establishment of a district provide certain 
80 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6101.05; S.D. Laws 1957, c. 492, §5; W. Va. 
Code (1955) §1409(38b). 
81 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2769(83); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6ll9.02; 
N.D. Laws (1957) c. 383, §2. 
82 E.g., County Water Districts Act, ll N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §255. 
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worthwhile benefits for the city, town, or village having a duty 
to acquire and maintain a water supply for its inhabitants. The 
municipal unit supplying water or having the general duty of 
safeguarding the interests of the people in an adequate supply 
of potable water will be aware of the need for additional supplies 
at a much earlier time than the individual water user. Municipal 
action on a petition for the establishment of a district will 
activate, alert, and encourage an otherwise unaware or lethargic 
population and thereby avoid a possible water crisis in the future. 
Representation of its inhabitants by the municipal corporation 
in signing a petition also will eliminate the difficulty of securing 
signatures within the municipality thereby facilitating the 
organization of a district. Probably, the most important bene-
fit to a municipality from being allowed to initiate by petition 
proceedings for the formation of a water district is the oppor-
tunity afforded thereby to determine or influence the decision 
of what is included in the petition and thereby in the charter of 
the district. The Ohio Regional Water and Sewer Districts Act,83 
for example, provides that the petition shall set forth the pur-
pose and boundaries of the proposed district and the manner 
of selection, number, term, and compensation of the governing 
body of the district.84 It is very possible that under this act a 
municipality could secure adequate representation on the board 
of directors by having the right to sign the petition on behalf of 
its inhabitants. 
The second method commonly employed to allow municipal 
participation in the affairs of the district is for the munici-
pality to be represented on the board of directors of the water 
supply district. District acts in West Virginia,85 Minnesota,86 
and Montana87 provide for representation of the municipality as 
a unit. The West Virginia act provides that cities of 3,000 to 
18,000 population within the district have one representative 
on the board and cities over 18,000 population have two repre-
sentatives. If the number of city representatives totals three 
or more, no additional members at large are included. City 
representatives are appointed by resolution of the municipal 
83 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §§6119.01 to 6119.42. 
84 Id., §6119.02. 
85 Public Service Districts for Water &: Sewage Services Act, W. Va. Code (1955) 
§1409(38c). 
86 Watershed Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §112.37. 
87 County Water Districts Act, Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §16-4506. 
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governmental body. In Minnesota, under the Watershed Act, 
managers of the board suggested in the petition are selected by 
the Water Resources Board as "representative of the local units 
of government affected."88 Montana, in the County Water Dis-
tricts Act, requires five directors to be elected at large and permits 
each mayor of the municipalities included in the district to 
appoint one additional representative of the municipality to 
the board. 
From the viewpoint of a municipality desiring to work 
through a local district to obtain a water supply, representation 
on the board of directors is very important. Once the munici-
pal government has been designated as the medium for treating 
the water supply problems of its people, it should not be sup-
planted in this duty when a local water district is formed. 
C. Districts Composed Solely of Governmental Units. 1. Gen-
eral. In eastern states where much of life's activity is centered 
in and about the cities, towns, and villages, the duty of supplying 
potable water generally has been assigned to the municipal gov-
ernments rather than to local water districts organized and 
managed by the individual inhabitants of the area. In the east-
ern states, where once water supplies were considered unlimited, 
the task of acquiring additional water for municipal uses is be-
coming more difficult. For these reasons, groups of municipal-
ities, rather than their inhabitants, are turning toward coopera-
tive endeavors such as water districts to provide the water re-
quired for their municipal works. As a result there has been a 
recent growth in the number of legislative , acts enabling the 
formation of districts organized solely on the basis of municipal 
corporations and managed solely through the governing bodies 
of the various member municipalities.89 Typical of this growth 
is the enactment by the Michigan legislature of three district 
acts for municipalities in a period of three years.90 
88 Note 86 supra. 
89 Concern for the insufficiency of available water in the eastern half of the United 
States has brought about a growing demand for legislation not only in the area of munic-
ipal water supply development but also in the area of water use law affecting by legislation 
the common law doctrine of riparian rights. 
90 Charter Water Authorities Act in 1957, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2533(31) to 
5.2533(59); Sewage Disposal and Water Supply Districts Act in 1956, Mich. Stat. Ann. 
(1958) §§5.2769(81) to 5.2769(92); Sewage Disposal and Water Supply System Authorities 
Act in 1955, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2769(51) to 5.2769(64). See also: Municipal Water 
Supply Authorities legislation of 1952, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2533(1) to 5.2533(12); The 
Metropolitan District Act in 1929, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2131 to 5.2145. 
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2. Joint water supply agreement. The least complex form 
of legislation providing for cooperation among municipalities 
is that which provides for what may be termed a "joint water 
supply agreement." Typical of this form of legislation is a Penn-
sylvania statute providing that two or more boroughs may 
unite in the construction or acquisition and maintenance of a 
water supply works.91 Connecticut,92 Michigan,93 and New 
York,94 in addition to joint action, permit the cities to appoint 
a board to handle the affairs of their joint acquisitions. The 
term "district" is misleading since there actually is no new gov-
ernmental subdivision or district created. The arrangement is 
based solely on contracts between municipalities and the only 
relation of a joint water supply arrangement to a water district 
is the provision, if any, for the appointment of a joint board 
to handle the water supply facilities. 
The benefit derived from a joint water supply agreement is 
primarily that of mutual financial assistance since municipalities 
are given no additional powers under the enabling legislation 
to facilitate the acquisition of a water supply other than the 
power to cooperate and contract with one another and the 
power to hold property jointly. The statutes are most important, 
however, in eliminating any question which might be raised 
concerning the power of a particular city to enter into such an 
agreement with another municipal government. 
3. Municipal water districts. The joint water supply agree-
ment has certain definite advantages for the cooperating munici-
pal membership; nevertheless it is not nearly as popular or use-
ful as a metropolitan water district. A metropolitan water dis-
trict is a separate political subdivision of the state formed by 
the governing bodies of two or more existing governmental units95 
for the purpose of obtaining a water supply. The only territory 
91 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §47435. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, 
§75-1; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §§160-191.6 to 160-191.10. 
92 Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §§344d to 346d, as amended by Pub. Act. No. 13, 
§35 (1957). 
93 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2532(1) to 5.2532(5). 
94 23 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §§110-117. 
95 Several of the water district acts discussed in this section envisage the formation of 
districts composed not only of cities, towns, and villages but also of counties, townships, 
and even special districts. In some states, the district acts are sufficiently broad to permit 
the association of more than one district forming a new and larger district unit. In 
other states, the language of the acts would exclude participation by water districts. For 
example, see the North Carolina Water and Sewer Authorities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
(Supp. 1957) §§162A-2(e) and 162A-3 which permit a district to be formed by two or more 
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of the district is that contained within the corporate limits of 
the constituent members. Legislation permitting water districts 
to be formed on the basis of governmental units has been enacted 
in Connecticut,96 Delaware,97 Maryland,98 Michigan,99 New Mex-
ico,100 North Carolina,101 Pennsylvania,102 Utah,103 Virgin-
ia,104 Washington,105 and Wisconsin.106 _ A metropolitan water 
district, in four states, 107 is formed by resolution or ordinance of 
the governing body of each included governmental unit ap-
proving the establishment of a district and adopting a charter or 
articles of incorporation. In five states108 a metropolitan water 
district is formed on the basis of a vote in favor of the district and 
its charter by a majority of the inhabitants of each governmental 
unit concerned. The Virginia act requires an election within any 
particular unit only if ten percent of the voters demand it.109 
Michigan has two acts requiring a vote of the people and two 
permitting organization by the governing bodies of the political 
units.110 
political subdivisions which include cities, towns, incorporated villages, counties, sanitation 
districts, and other political subdivisions or public corporations of the state. Compare 
the New Mexico Water Supply Associations Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §14-40-75, 
which includes only incorporated cities, towns and villages. In this paper, the term 
"governmental units" rather than "municipal units" is used so as to include all of the 
possible member governments instead of cities, towns, and villages only. 
96 Metropolitan District Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §§347d-353d, as amended 
by Pub. Act No. 13, §36 (1957). 
97 Water and/or Sewer Authorities Act, Del. Code Ann. (Supp. 1956) tit. 16, §§1401-
1421. 
98 Water and/or Sewer Authorities Act, Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §§445-466. 
99 Metropolitan District Act, Charter Water Authorities Act, Municipal Water Supply 
Authorities legislation, Sewage Disposal and Water Supply System Authorities Act, note 
90 supra. 
100 Water Supply Associations Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §§14-40-'75 to 14-40-90. 
101 Water and Sewer Authorities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §§162A-1 to 
162A-19. 
102 Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957} tit. 53J 
§§301-322. 
103 Metropolitan Water Districts Act, Utah Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1957) §§73-8-1 to 
73-8-55. 
104 Water and Sewer Authorities Act, Va. Code. (1956 repl.; Supp. 1958) §§15-764.l to 
15-764.32. 
105 Metropolitan Municipal Corporations Act, Wash. Laws (1957) c. 213. 
106 Municipal Water Districts Act, Wis. Stat. (195'7) §198.22. 
107 Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. 
108 Connecticut, Delaware, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
100 Note 104 supra, at §15-764.6. 
110 Note 90 supra. Metropolitan District Act and the Charter Water Authorities Act 
require approval by the electorate of each governmental component; Sewage Disposal 
and Water Supply System Authorities Act and the Municipal Water Supply Authorities 
legislation permit organization by the governmental bodies without an election. 
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Although in the establishment of a metropolitan water dis-
trict, practical considerations will dictate that the component 
governmental units be located in the same general area, the 
existing legislation usually does not require that the units form-
ing the district be adjacent to one another. It is possible, there-
fore, for municipalities separated by farming areas, for instance, 
to work together through a district even though the intervening 
farmers are in no way interested in a water supply district. On 
the other hand, most of the district acts provide for cooperation 
by governmental units rather than by cities, towns, and villages 
only.111 In this way, a municipality which is distant from any 
other city, town, or village, nevertheless may cooperate with 
the county or township in which the municipality is situated. 
All states which have passed enabling legislation for the 
establishment of water supply districts composed solely of gov-
ernmental units have provided that the district board of directors 
be composed of representatives from the various member units. 
A majority of the statutes provide expressly that the chief ex-
ecutive or governing body of the political unit appoint its rep-
resentative. The other statutes allow the manner of selec-
tion and appointment of directors to be determined by the com-
ponent municipalities in the charter or articles of incorporation. 
In the district acts which set forth the manner of representation 
on the board, it is customary for each component unit, in addition 
to its one representative, to be granted extra representatives on 
the basis of property evaluation or water consumption within the 
particular unit.112 By granting additional votes to larger govern-
mental units, it is possible to provide a relatively equitable repre-
sentation of all members' interests.U3 Some of the statutes are 
silent as to the withdrawal from the district by a municipality; 
however, others set forth a procedure for withdrawal similar to 
that provided for joining the district. 
To the municipal government which has the duty of furnish-
111 Note 95 supra. 
112 In Michigan Charter Water Authorities Act, note 90 supra, at §5.2533(36), 
and in the Utah act, note 103 supra, at §73-8-20, as amended, the voting strength of 
individual representatives is increased by one vote on the basis of property evaluation 
within their respective governmental units. In Washington, note 105 supra, at §12, a 
detailed listing of representation is set forth. Wisconsin, note 106 supra, at §198.22(4a), 
grants additional votes to representatives of the governmental bodies on the basis of 
water consumption within the particular governmental unit. 
113 The North Carolina act requires one director to be appointed by the state gov-
ernor, note 101 supra, at §162A-5. 
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ing water to its inhabitants, a district formed by the governmental 
units and a board of directors appointed by the constituent mu-
nicipal governing bodies and responsible directly thereto is a 
most satisfactory method of establishing and operating the water 
district. In this way the district becomes the medium whereby 
the municipality, by appointing skilled and competent repre-
sentatives, may further its aim and fulfill its duty of acquiring 
water for its people. 
D. District Powers and Financing. In each of the district acts 
providing for partial or total participation by the municipal unit, 
the general powers granted to the district are sufficiently exten-
sive to accomplish the purposes of the organization. All of the 
acts permit the acquisition of property by the district, and cer-
tain acts delegate expressly to the district power to acquire by 
purchase or eminent domain property beyond the district bound-
aries.114 In states where district acts do not grant extraterritorial 
powers, court interpretation of the act must be relied upon to 
furnish these powers. Thus, the district, and the municipality 
acting through the district, face the same legal problems and 
questions regarding extraterritorial powers as does the individual 
municipality when it seeks to go beyond its corporate limits for 
a water supply. 
In establishing the water district acts, no legislature has seen 
fit to delegate to the districts created general police power for the 
protection of their waters or facilities. The district is handicapped 
within and without its limits since it. has no police power what-
soever. The district must rely on general statutes of the state to 
protect its waters and facilities. Besides state legislation it is pos-
sible that, in the interest of the health, safety, and general wel-
fare of its own population, a municipality which is a member of 
the district and in whose borders the district facilities are located 
could use its own police power to protect the district's water 
and equipment from harm. 
Since a most important aspect of the water district is its po-
tential financing benefits to the municipalities associating there-
with, a city contemplating the formation of, or association with, 
a water district will be much concerned with the financing struc-
ture and powers of the district. It would be beyond the scope of 
this paper to discuss the many details of the financial structure of 
114 E.g., Wis. Stat. (1957) §198.12(1). 
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the various water district acts and since problems of financing 
and taxation are peculiar to the individual states it would serve 
very little purpose. There are, however, certain features of the 
revenue provisions which are common to many of the acts. 
In establishing the district acts, the legislatures almost always 
have provided two standard financing devices for the district. 
These revenue measures include (I) the power to fix and collect 
charges for services and (2) the power to issue bonds.115 Service 
charges may be fixed without the approval of the electorate; how-
ever, some statutes require the rates to be reasonable, 116 uni-
form, 117 or equitable.118 Other statutes provide expressly that the 
rates charged are to be determined solely by the district board of 
directors.U0 The power to issue bonds for major improvements 
generally is vested in the discretion of the board of directors, but 
a few jurisdictions require that the question of bond financing 
be submitted to the electorate.120 
In addition to granting power to charge for services and issue 
bonds, many of the statutes grant taxing power to the district.121 
In some the power to tax is relatively unlimited; in others it can 
be used only for certain designated purposes.122 A few statutes 
grant the power to levy special assessments123 while two others 
grant to the district power to charge tapping fees.124 The Wash-
ington Metropolitan Municipal Corporations Act provides for 
the levy of a charge each year against the municipalities that com-
prise the district to furnish "supplemental income" for the dis-
trict to pay the expenses which cannot be met by the other 
115 E.g., Va. Code (Supp. 1958) §15-764.12(g). 
116 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6101.24; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §450(K); 
Del. Code Ann. (Supp. 1956) tit. 16, §1406(Il). 
117 Md. Code Ann., note 116 supra; Del. Code Ann., note Il6 supra. 
118 Utah Code Ann. (1953) §73-8-21(8). 
110 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §306(h); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) 
§162A-6(i). 
120 Utah Code Ann. (1953) §73-8-22. Michigan Charter Water Authorities Act, note 
90 supra, at §5.2533(44a), requires an election on the issue of bonds if demanded by two 
percent of the voters within the district. Wash. Laws (1957) c. 213, §45, requires an election 
whenever the district officers desire to issue general obligation bonds for capital improve-
ments. Cf. §46 concerning revenue bonds for purposes other than capital improvements. 
121 Michigan Charter Water Authorities Act, note 90 supra, at §§5.2533(46) and (48); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6Il9.06(M); Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §73-8-18(i). 
122 The Michigan provisions, note 121 supra, permit trucing to pay interest on bonded 
indebtedness and for administrative expenses. 
123 Note 105 supra, at §50; Michigan Metropolitan District Act, note 90 supra, at 
§5.2134(e); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §§6101.48, 6119.06(M). 
124 Note 98 supra, at §450(q); note 97 supra, at §1406(17). 
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sources of revenue.125 This revenue device is a further recogni-
tion of the municipal government as the basis of the district 
rather than individual landowners. 
E. Summary. Water supply district legislation enacted to fa-
cilitate cooperative effort in acquiring potable water and per-
mitting either partial or total participation by the city as a govern-
mental unit is not new or revolutionary. There are sufficient com-
plete acts with substantial similarity to furnish adequate prece-
dent and assistance to a legislature which is conside'ring the adop-
tion of such an act or to a city pressing for this legislation. 
A city which has the municipal function of supplying its in-
habitants with water should examine available district legislation 
carefully before acting to make certain that the city will be ade-
quately represented in the affairs of the district. Where the prime 
interest of the city is to acquire additional water to be furnished 
to its inhabitants through its existing facilities, the city's interests 
will not be represented or protected by a board of directors elected 
at large from the district area. On the other hand, complete 
representation of the municipality may not be possible since lack 
of sufficient interest or official responsibility on the part of ad-
jacent units of government may force the municipality to oper-
ate within a district composed of individual landowners instead 
of official governmental units. Once a municipality is assured of 
adequate representation in the operation of the district, it must 
consider the benefits accruing from associating with individuals 
or groups outside its corporate limits as opposed to acting alone. 
Present district acts do not provide any powers facilitating the ac-
quisition of a water supply in addition to those already possessed 
by most individual municipal corporations. However, the powers 
granted to the district to provide for the financing of a coopera-
tive water supply system more often than not will prove attrac-
tive and beneficial to the participating municipality. 
V. WATER CONSERVATION FOR FUTURE MUNICIPAL NEEDS 
A. General Observations. As the population increases and the 
economy expands, a greater amount of land once classified as 
rural or undeveloped is being subdivided for residential purposes 
or utilized for industrial location. These developments add to 
the over-all demand for water supply, and, at the same time, by 
125 Note 105 supra, at §41. 
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their unregulated location, eliminate or destroy possible sites for 
the conservation of water supplies to answer their demand. The 
trend toward urbanization is pushing water supply sites farther 
and farther away from the reach of the central municipality, and 
large tracts of land once spotted with municipalities are growing 
rapidly into vast metropolitan areas. 
The problem created by this expanding development, from 
the viewpoint of public health, safety, and general welfare, is 
that future sites for water development and conservation are be-
ing destroyed. Since the water areas are numbered and the quan-
tity of water is limited, the unthinking destruction of water con-
servation areas increases the danger of water shortage and brings 
nearer the day of water rationing. · 
Haphazard land development has been recognized for many 
years as undesirable and detrimental to the public interest. In 
addition to eminent domain, land use planning and comprehen-
sive zoning regulations have been employed to restrict the care-
less utilization of land. Although generally concerned only with 
the location of streets and parks, the size and location of struc-
tures, and the restriction of certain businesses and occupations, 
comprehensive planning and zoning action represents the most 
feasible method, short of eminent domain, available for conserv-
ing and protecting sources of water and areas for water develop-
ment in the future. 
B. Land Use Planning. Legislation providing for the initi-
ation of land use planning by a governmental unit contemplates 
the systematic working out of a proposed developmental scheme 
for a particular area, culminating usually in the production of a 
master or comprehensive plan.126 This plan then serves as a guide 
for the legislative body of the local governmental unit in enacting 
zoning legislation as well as in placing public buildings, parks, 
streets, etc. Actually, the most important value of land use plan-
ning is that it guides the actions of the local legislators; neverthe-
less, planning statutes have a bearing on the problem of conserv-
ing desirable water development sites. 
Planning statutes provide for the appointment by the munici-
pality of a planning commission empowered to develop a master 
plan for the municipal area including territory outside the mu-
126 Cf. Village of Lynbrook v. Cadoo, 252 N.Y. 308, 169 N.E. 394 (1929); Call Bond 
& Mortgage Co. v. Sioux City, 219 Iowa 572, 259 N.W. 33 (1935). 
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nidpal limits which bears a relation to planning within the mu-
nicipality.127 This plan reflects the proposed general development 
in terms of residential, commercial, and industrial use, and also 
sets out specific areas for the future location of streets, public 
parks, public buildings, and improvements.128 The language of 
the statutes is sufficiently broad to include planning for the loca-
tion of water reservoir sites and water supply areas.129 Once 
adopted by the municipal legislature, this plan becomes the of-
ficial guide for future location of public buildings and improve-
ments.130 By adopting the plan, the municipality has given official 
notice of its intention to take specific areas by purchase or con-
demnation in the future.r The effect of this notice is to cloud, in 
an unofficial manner, the title of the land to be taken and to dis-
courage thereby the development of the land.131 Accordingly, the 
area likely will not be greatly developed until the municipality 
acquires it for the designated public purpose. This indirect 
method of reservation, however, is effective only as to lands that 
ultimately will be taken for public use. Development in the gen-
eral watershed area not designated for condemnation will be un-
affected by the adoption of a master plan. · 
C. Land Reservation by Statutory Procedure. The adoption 
of a master plan may provide in an extra-legal way for the preser-
vation of desirable sites for future public improvements; how-
127 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2996; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §30653 
(second class cities); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:13; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.044(1) 
(first class cities); Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 41, §SID; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (Deering, 
1958) §65-460. 
128 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2996; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §30653 
(second class cities); N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §36:13; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.046 (first 
class cities); Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 41, §SID. 
120 Note 127 supra. Some statutes provide expressly for designation of the general 
location and extent of facilities for water supply. E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2996; 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:13; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.046 (first class cities). 
· 130 E.g., statutes requiring approval of location of public improvements and build-
ings by the planning commission after an official plan has been adopted: Mich. Stat. Ann. 
(1958) §§5.2999, 5.3000; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.059 (first class cities), 100.680 (third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth class cities); Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (Deering, 1958) §§65549-65553. 
Some statutes limit municipal action only as to the location of public streets and highways. 
E.g., Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 41, §SIG. Even without statutes expressly requiring the 
municipality to follow a master plan, the efforts and conclusions of the municipal plan-
ning commission represented in the plan coupled with official adoption of the plan by 
the local governing body renders the plan a clear indicator of the future actions of the 
municipality. In planning the private development of land, it would be most unwise to 
ignore the directions of the master plan solely on the basis that the plan need not be 
followed by the municipal governing body. 
131 See Cram, "Master Planning Creates Clouds on Titles," 35 MICH. ST. B. J. 9 (April 
1956). 
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ever, most states have provided a statutory method for the official 
reservation of lands for certain public purposes. For the most 
part, the statutes apply only to the reservation of lands for future 
use as streets and highways; nevertheless, they deserve considera-
tion as possible methods which may be used in future legislative 
enactments to secure the reservation of lands for water develop-
ment and conservation. 
A majority of the states, having provided for the establishment 
of a municipal planning commission,132 permit the municipality 
to pass an ordinance prohibiting the granting of a building 
permit for any structure to be located on the land charted for 
use in th~ future as a public street or highway.133 Provision is 
made, however, for granting permits for the location of struc-
tures in areas marked for public taking if the property will not 
yield a reasonable return to the owner unless such permit is 
granted, or if "the grant of such permit is required by consider-
ations of justice and equity."134 
The Michigan act, in addition to the preservation of future 
street sites, allows the municipality to deny a permit for building 
in "any park, playground or other public grounds."135 New 
Jersey, in addition to street sites, permits the municipality to 
prohibit buildings in a "drainage right of way."136 It is possible 
under the Michigan act to argue that sites for the future storage 
and development of a water supply may be protected under the 
language "public grounds."137 These statutes, however, are un-
common, since in the majority of states the provisions are limited 
to a denial of building permits for construction in street sites. 
The statutes give no clear delegation of power to the munici-
~32 It should be noted that the municipal planning commissions generally have the 
duty not only to formulate a master plan but also to develop charts and plats detailed 
as to the exact location of public improvem~nts. Statutes allowing the denial of permits 
for building on certain lands refer to the lands charted on a detailed plat and not to 
those lands designated for future use on the general master plan only. 
133 E.g., Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66B, §§31, 32; 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1951) §35; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:30. 
134 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:31. A provision similar in content to the New 
Hampshire statute appears as part of all statutes allowing permits to be denied for 
building on lands charted for future municipal acquisition. 
135 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.3007(4). 
136 N .J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §40:55-1.38. Drainage right-of-way means the "lands 
required for the installation of storm water sewers or drainage ditches or required along 
a natural stream or watercourse for preserving the channel and providing for the flow 
of water therein to safeguard the public against flood damage .••• " Id. at §40:55-1.31. 
137 Note 135 supra. 
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palities to control building in proposed streets or public grounds 
outside the municipal limits.138 In some states where the master 
plan may include areas outside the municipality bearing a re-
lation to the municipal planning, it is possible to argue, under 
the particular language of the statutes, that the adopting of a 
detailed plat of proposed streets based on the master plan gives 
to the municipality power to plat land for streets outside its 
limits and regulate building on such land.139 
With the growing need to conserve and protect areas suited 
for the development and storage of water supplies, new legis-
lation enabling local units of government to conserve these areas 
will become imperative. Denying permits for building seems 
to be a practical and useful solution. However, in view of the 
constitutional prohibition against the taking of property for a 
public purpose without compensation, it must be recognized 
that there are limitations on the power of the municipality to 
prohibit building in areas designated for public use. Substantial 
or total depreciation in the value or use of a person's lands by 
reason of the denial of a building permit will render the denial 
unconstitutional, thereby necessitating the granting of a permit.140 
In two jurisdictions at least, Kentucky141 and Pennsylvania,142 
a statutory scheme has been devised to enable a municipality 
to reserve lands for future street use without violating the con-
stitutional rights of the landowner. The municipality, having 
designated on its official plats the location of future streets and 
highways, is entitled to have these locations reserved upon the 
payment of compensation as determined by a board of appraisers. 
Reservation of the lands for future streets does not in any way 
188 But cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951 repl.) §53-754 which allows the municipality 
to deny an "improvement location permit" for building in certain areas outside municipal 
limits if the unincorporated area outside the boundaries is not subject to existing county 
planning. 
139 Cf. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2996, 5.3007(1), 5.3007(4). 
140 With the exception of cases in New York, there is a scarcity of cases on the 
question of the constitutionality of the denial of permits in particular instances. See 
Rand v. City of New York, 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 753 (1956), concerning substantial interference 
with landowner's use of his property; Roer Constr. Corp. v. New Rochelle, 136 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 414 (1954), where the entire property of a landowner was charted for highway pur-
poses. In both cases, the court held that the denial of a building permit to the land-
owners constituted a taking of property without just compensation and was unconstitu-
tional. Cf. note 166 infra. 
141 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.790 to 100.830 (relates to third, fourth, fifth, and 
sixth class cities). 
142 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §§22777-22779 (relates to second class cities). 
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impair or limit the lawful use of the land by the owner, including 
the construction of buildings thereon. However, when the land 
is finally taken for the public use, no compensation is granted for 
the taking or in jury of any structure built during the reservation 
period.143 
The compensatory scheme has certain advantages over the 
system of reserving lands through a denial of building permits. 
By compensating the owner, any and all lands desired by the 
municipality may be placed on reserve. A building permit may 
be denied without compensating the owner only if there is no 
substantial injury to the landowner. Further, under the com-
pensation plan, structures erected on the land during the period 
of reservation do not add to the cost of condemnation since their 
value is not recoverable.144 If regulation is carried out through 
denial of building permits, any variance which was necessitated 
under the terms of the statutes increases the cost of condemnation 
when the municipality finally takes the land.145 
The compensatory system of land reservation, of course, is 
not without difficulties. First, compensating the owner for res-
ervation of his land presents a financial burden for the munici-
pality which traditionally has insufficient funds to manage 
properly municipal affairs. Secondly, the statutory provisions, 
by permitting continued lawful use of the reserved land by the 
owner, open the door to possible destruction of the land for the 
public use intended. This danger is not very great when the 
intended use is for street construction, but it will increase if 
this statutory scheme is applied as a method to reserve lands 
for purposes of the conservation of natural resources. 
D. Zoning. I. Legislative delegation of zoning power. Before 
a municipality can consider the feasibility of zoning in order 
to conserve and protect a water source area, it must possess the 
delegated power to zone for this purpose. Zoning constitutes an 
exercise of the police power of the state, 146 which power is not 
148 The Kentucky provision allows reservation of land located as far as five miles 
from the municipal corporate limits. [Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.790, 100.720]. The Penn-
sylvania act covers only land located within the municipal limits. 
144 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.830; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §22779. 
145 In re Southern Boulevard, Borough of Bronx, City of New York, 262 App. Div. 
263, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 386 (1941); Platt v. City of New York, 92 N.Y.S. (2d) 138, revd. on 
other grounds, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 738 (1949). Cf. Matter of City of New 
York, 196 N.Y. 255, 89 N.E. 814 (1909). 
146 Leary v. Adams, 226 Ala. 472, 147 S. 391 (1933); State v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 157 
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inherent within the general powers of the municipal govern-
ment. Zoning power must be delegated by state constitution or 
statute, or municipal charter.147 Without an expressed delegation 
of power, the municipality cannot enact zoning regulations or 
restrictions. 
State legislatures have seen fit to grant zoning power to 
municipalities, realizing the need and importance of this func-
tion to orderly land development. The power has been limited 
to lands located within the municipal limits. Extraterritorial 
zoning power generally has not been granted, although, as has 
been noted, delegations of power enabling the municipality to 
preserve the purity of its existing extraterritorial water supplies 
are now quite common.148 
Power to enact zoning restrictions within the municipal 
limits must be construed in accordance with the terms of the 
legislative delegation of power. Municipal power to zone is 
limited and controlled by the provisions of the legislative grant.149 
Statutes delegating zoning power generally contain two separate 
provisions which are relevant here: (I) a list of objects and 
activities which may be regulated, and (2) a list of purposes for 
which regulations may be imposed. As to the first, municipalities 
traditionally may regulate the height ~nd size of buildings and 
other structures, the percentage of the lot to be occupied, the 
size of yards, courts, and open spaces, the density of population 
and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for 
trade, industry, residences and other purposes.150 With reference 
to the purposes for which zoning regulations may be enacted, 
the statutes provide that regulations may be imposed to protect 
and preserve the public health, safety, and general welfare, as 
S. 651 (1934); Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374, 194 N.E. 537 (1935); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio 
St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Kroner v. Portland, 116 Ore. 141, 240 P. 536 (1925). 
147 Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.'E. (2d) 164 (1946); Clements v. McCabe, 210 
Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920); 8 McQUILI.IN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.35 
(1957). Legislative delegation of zoning powers to a municipality is constitutional. Brady 
v. Keene, 90 N.H. 99, 4 A. (2d) 658 (1939). 
148 Section 11-E supra. See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL I.Aw 321-322 (1957), regarding the few 
examples of extraterritorial zoning powers. 
149 Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. (2d) 704 (1943); Brown v. Board 
of Appeals, 327 III. 644, 159 N;E. 225 (1927); 122 Main Street Corp. v. Brockton, 323 
Mass. 646, 84 N.E. (2d) 13 (1949); Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E. (2d) 164 (1946); 
Holzhauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N.W. 852 (1924). 
150 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §73-1; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66B, §21; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. (1955) §31:60; N.J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §40:55-30; Pa .. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 
1957) tit. 53, §14752. 
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well as to lessen traffic congestion, secure safety from fires, pro-
vide adequate light and air, prevent overcrowding and facilitate 
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, 
parks, and other public requirements.151 
Zoning power, as delegated to the municipalities, is limited 
to the regulation of specified objects and activities for certain 
stipulated purposes.152 If the preservation of water development 
sites cannot be accomplished in a practical manner by means of 
the specific regulations and restrictions provided in the statutes, 
or if the safeguarding of water sites is not a lawful purpose for 
which zoning may be utilized, the zoning power will furnish no 
solution to the problem of dissappearing water source areas.153 
The statutory listing of objects and activities which may be 
regulated is broad, and appears adequate to permit the regulation 
and restriction of undesirable development in the area proposed 
for water conservation or storage. Regulation of the size of yards 
and courts, coupled with regulation of the density of population, 
if necessary, provides a useful way of facilitating drainage in the 
area and preserving the watershed. From the viewpoint of safe-
guarding water development areas, the most appropriate type 
of regulation permitted under the delegation of zoning powers 
is the regulation of the use of land and structures for trade, in-
dustry, residences, and other purposes. Through this type of 
regulation, the municipality is able to exclude from the water 
conservation area businesses which would tend to destroy the 
water supply by pollution as well as activities on the land which 
might be detrimental to the area as a good watershed. 
In listing the promotion of health, safety, and general wel-
fare as one of the purposes for which zoning may be exercised, 
the legislatures have delegated to municipalities power to zone 
to the fullest extent and for the widest purpose consistent with 
constitutional principles. Preservation of existing potable water 
supplies clearly is in the interest of the public health, safety, 
and general welfare. There is no doubt that conservation of our 
natural resources for man's future use is within the statutory 
151 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §73-1; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66B, §21; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. (1955) §31:62; N.J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §40:55-32; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 
1957) tit. 53, §14754. 
152 Notes 150, 151 supra. 
153 The ability of the municipality to zone legally must be construed according to 
the terms of the legislative grant of power. Note 149 supra. 
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provision permitting zoning to be utilized for the purpose of 
public health, safety, and general welfare.154 Nevertheless, it 
must be pointed out that, although justified as protecting 
the public health, safety, and general welfare, the conserva-
tion of natural resources generally has not been considered 
the purpose of zoning regulations. Ac; evidenced by the particular 
purposes set forth in the statutes delegating power, zoning tra-
ditionally has been used for the purpose of avoiding slums and 
maintaining healthful and attractive residential areas. Whether, 
under traditional statutes granting zoning powers, a court will 
allow zoning for conservation purposes is a matter for specu-
lation.155 However, if a court is apprised of the necessity for 
conserving natural resources, the provision in the statutes dele-
gating power to zone in the interest of the public health, safety, 
and general welfare is sufficient to allow the municipality to 
zone to preserve sources of potable water for future use. 
In a few states, the legislatures, in delegating zoning powers 
to local governmental units, have recognized the possible use of 
zoning to conserve natural resources.156 These states provide ex-
pressly that zoning regulations may be enacted for conservation 
154 Hudson Water Co. v. Mccarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), the right of New Jersey to 
prohibit transportation of water from New Jersey streams to New York was upheld as 
a valid use of the police power to protect the waters of New Jersey. Cf. In re Willow 
Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 144 P. 505 (1914). See Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 
(1920), concerning preservation of natural gas; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 
(1900); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937), restricting the use of sweet 
gas; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931), affg. 110 Cal. App. 123, 
293 P. 899 (1930), upholding as a valid police regulation the California conservation 
statute. This statute is now found at Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. (Deering, 1954; Supp. 
1957) §§3000 et seq.; Richfield Oil Corp. v. Crawford, 39 Cal. (2d) 729, 249 P. (2d) 600 
(1952), permitting the legislature to provide for the prevention of the waste of oil and 
gas; Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 P. 841 (1930); comment, 
19 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 416 (1931). 
155 Although the statutes delegating zoning power to municipalities set forth the 
protection of the public health, safety, and general welfare as a legitimate purpose for 
which the zoning power may be exercised, this general purpose is listed with other more 
specific purposes which are all directed toward the preservation or establishment of 
'healthful conditions in the specific area which is zoned. Under the rule of statutory 
construction, ejusdem generis, the general purpose would be interpreted in the light of, 
or -limited by, the specific purposes enumerated. 
156 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951 repl.) §53-756(5) provides that a municipality may 
"classify and designate the rural lands amongst agricultural, industrial, commercial, 
residential and other uses and purposes." Va. Code Ann. (1956 repl.) §15-844 allows 
counties to zone "for the purpose of promoting health, safety, order, prosperity, the 
conservation of natural resources and the general welfare." Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) 
§§396.01, 396.03(5), permit certain counties to zone "to conserve and develop natural 
resources." See also Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1956) tit. 16, §§2026, 5226 (counties); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. (1957) §§60.74(1), 60.74(3) (towns); Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2961(1), 5.2963(1) 
(county and township). 
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purposes. The Georgia statute, for example, states that munici-
palities may adopt zoning regulations for the purpose, among 
others, of "conserving and developing the natural resources."1117 
Provisions of this type extend the traditional concept of zoning 
purposes and clearly may serve as a basis for conserving areas for 
a water supply and for water development sites for future use. 
Statutes similar to the Georgia enactment are not very common, 
however, and, of the few state statutes existing, most are limited 
to zoning by authorities in the counties where most undeveloped 
land is located.158 
2. Extraterritorial zoning power. Since municipalities generally 
have not been granted power to zone beyond their corporate 
limits, the most direct method available for a municipality to ac-
complish extraterritorial zoning is to cooperate with governmen-
tal units controlling the outside territory.159 Often this coopera-
tion will be informal, without statutory basis. On the other hand, 
statutory authorization may exist, as in Illinois, for the coopera-
tion of local units of government in matters pertaining to the 
zoning of land in the general area of the municipality.160 This 
authorization, however, in no way grants to a municipal unit 
power to enforce the zoning of areas beyond its corporate limits. 
The most detailed method provided by statute for the co-
operation of a municipality with outside governmental units is a 
provision, as in Kentucky, for the establishment of a city-county 
planning and zoning commission.161 This commission has the 
power to prepare for the area within and without the municipal 
boundaries a comprehensive development plan including a mas-
ter plan, a zoning plan and regulations and restrictions relating 
thereto, and a subdivision control plan.162 Before the comprehen-
sive plan with its zoning regulations and restrictions becomes ef-
fective, it must be approved by both the county and the city gov-
erning bodies.163 
1111 Ga. Code Ann. (1957) §69.802. 
1118 Note 156 supra. For a consideration of rural zoning, see Warp, "The Legal Status 
of Rural Zoning," 36 Iu.. L. REV. 153 (1941). 
159 For a discussion of extraterritorial zoning by a municipality, see Bouwsma, "The 
Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning," 8 VAND. L. REv. 806 (1954); Bartelt, 
"Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on Its Validity," 32 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 367 (1957). 
160 III. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 34, §152n. See a similar provision at Ga. Code Ann. (1957) 
§69-807. 
161 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.031-100.098 (county with first class city), 100.320-100.490 
(county with second class city). 
102 Id. at §§100.044, 100.350. 
163 Id. at §§100.048, 100.400-100.410. 
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A city-county planning and zoning commission is the most 
effective and efficient· method now available whereby a munici-
pality may effect extraterritorial zoning. From the viewpoint of 
·the· municipality, the lack of extraterritorial zoning powers re-
stricts municipal activities and interferes with planning. On the 
other hand, in the interest of the orderly and balanced develop-
ment of an entire area of which the municipality is only a part, 
it is desirable to "restrain" the municipality by preventing it 
from controlling the lands beyond its borders. The city-county 
commission allows the municipality to place before the county 
governing body, through the municipal representatives, plans 
and suggestions for regulation of lands outside the corporate lim-
its. On the other hand, a joint commission, subject to the county 
officials as well as municipal authorities, provides representation 
and protection for the persons and lands beyond municipal 
borders. 
The zoning power whether exercised by an inter-governmen-
tal organization or by a governmental unit outside the munici-
pality, must be delegated by the state to the local unit. This dele-
gation of power must be examined to determine whether it may 
be used by the local unit for the purpose of conserving the disap-
pearing water development sites. Legal issues as to the scope of 
the delegated power are the same whether the power is exer-
cised by a municipality within its limits or by a county or inter-
governmental body outside the municipal limits. 
· 3. Reasonableness of zoning regulations. If, in the interest of 
the public health, safety, and general welfare, action to conserve 
sources of potable water for the future requirements of a popu-
lace is permitted as a proper purpose of zoning, the sole issue re-
maining is what particular restrictions or regulations will be per-
mitted. Because of the great divergence of factual settings, it is 
impossible to suggest in detail what specific regulations will be re-
quired to preserve effectively the natural water source area. The 
law as to the validity of a zoning regulation is the same as that of 
any police· measure, namely, the regulation must be reasonable 
under the· c;:ircumstances.164 Determinations of the reasonable-
ness of zoning regulations are controlled by the facts in each in-
stance.165 Probably a regulation aimed at keeping industry, which 
164 58 AM. JUR., Zoning §14 (1948), and cases cited therein. 
165 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 
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would pollute the future water source, out of the area of the water 
supply would be held reasonable. On the other hand, restrictions 
freezing completely the development of the area probably would 
be held unconstitutional as constituting a taking of property 
without compensation.166 Between these extremes, the validity or 
invalidity of particular zoning restrictions will depend on the 
facts in the individual case. 
E. Summary. A municipality desiring to preserve and protect 
waters and water development sites for future use must be con-
cerned (1) with the protection of particular parcels of land for fu-
ture condemnation, and (2) with the conservation of lands located 
in the general area of the chosen sites. With reference to property 
destined for acquisition, the municipality is interested not only in 
maintaining it in a condition fit for future public use but also in 
preventing development which would add to the cost of acquisi-
tion. The prime interest in lands surrounding the future public 
site is to regulate and restrict activities on those lands which may 
have a detrimental effect on the water supply or water develop-
ment site. 
Statutory delegations of power to municipalities which per-
mit control and protection of lands marked for future condem-
nation exist as part of the planning and charting powers of the 
municipal corporation. The most common power is that allowing 
the municipality to deny building permits for construction in 
areas marked for future public use. On the other hand, the most 
effective power to reserve lands, presenting fewer constitutional 
difficulties, is that afforded by a statutory system providing for 
compensation to the owner for the reservation of his land. Both 
powers are now limited to regulation of land designated for street 
construction. With expansion, these systems may provide valuable 
assistance to the municipality trying to protect, for future con-
demnation, water supply and development areas. 
The most feasible method available for regulating lands in the 
N.E. 120 (1925); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Senefsky 
v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W. (2d) 387 (1943). · 
166 See Henle v. Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258 at 264, 125 N.E. (2d). 355 (1954), where_ 
the court stated: "The claim that the city has the right to 'freeze' plaintiff's property, 
preventing her from its beneficial use until the city gets around to appropriating it for 
public purposes as a part of the Lakeland Freeway, is without foundation. If the city 
needs the property in that development, then an immediate· proceeding in eminent domain 
would end this lawsuit."· · 
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general area of the future public water supply or development is 
zoning. Through the zoning power, reasonable regulations may 
be imposed to avoid development in the area of the future pub-
lic improvement which will prove detrimental to the site for the 
public use intended to be made of it. In most states, however, it 
is not settled whether the conservation of natural resources is a 
purpose, within "the legislative grant of power, for which a munic-
ipality may exercise its zoning powers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion, both of case and statute law, reveals 
that municipalities generally are well equipped to secure and pro-
tect a water supply for their inhabitants. Where, in some states, 
adequate powers for the municipality are lacking, they can be 
supplied with ease by legislative grant. Even in the field of future 
water needs, the municipalities may be able, and, with legislative 
delegation of authority, will be able, to protect and reserve water 
source areas and water development sites for future use without 
condemnation. 
An increase in power enabling the municipality to reach out 
and take or reserve potable water supplies is a logical method of 
answering the growing demands for water within municipal 
boundaries. Yet as the demands for more and more water increase 
and the great water source areas dwindle before the encroaching 
urban population, it is time to question the feasibility and wis-
dom of continuing to arm small local segments of the government 
with extensive uncontrolled powers in the field of water supply. 
When the supply of water far outdistanced the demand, it made 
little difference where or how a particular group of people ac-
quired their water. When the quantity of demand begins to ap-
proach the availability of supply, however, the uncontrolled grab-
bing of available water resources by municipalities will preclude 
equitable apportionment of the waters, interfere with the normal 
development of the state, and create serious conflicts between mu-
nicipalities competing for water. The water resource is intimately 
connected with the expansion, development, and well-being of a 
state. As the excess of water supply in a state dwindles, it is ques-
tionable whether the people as a whole will be benefited by al-
lowing municipal authorities representing their own particular 
interests to exercise great powers without state supervision in the 
acquisition and control of the state's water resources. 
